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J.: Workmen's Compensation Act--Time of Accrual of Liability--Silicos
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
mitting payments of compensation and other duties. Then, "if the
circumstances of this case were such that the employer should be
charged with misleading or duping the employee," the employer's
conduct, constructively that of the commissioner, should estop the
commissioner to deny that timely filing of the application had in
fact been made.
The case of Robinson v. State Compensation Comom'r,9 is an
example of conduct not sufficient to constitute an estoppel. Where
the claimant failed to file application for readjustment of his compensation claim within the one-year period prescribed by statute,
the commissioner's letter, to the effect that the claimant had been
amply compensated for the loss of an eye and that the defect of
vision of the other eye was in no way connected with the injury,
was not sufficient to estop him to deny that a proper claim had in
fact been filed. In this case the court states in express terms a
limitation on this principle of estoppel which may or may not
have been implied in the earlier decisions. In the language of the
court: "An employee . . . who seeks to have his case reopened for
an additional award by an oral request within the statutory period
...
must make an affirmative showing that following such request
and within the limitation period, the commissioner pursued such a
course of conduct that he is estopped to deny that a proper application had in fact been filed."
The essence of the Turnzer decision, the principal case, is that
the conduct of the commissioner unintentionally misled the claimant
and caused him to waive a "substantial right." The case indicates
no significant departure from the policy enunciated in the cases
discussed; rather, it assumes its role as another thrust in the direction of liberal application of the workmen's compensation law.
G. S. B.
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Claimant had been employed for well over two years as a coal
loader for different companies in West Virginia and during all
that time had been exposed to silicon dioxide dust. When in the
employ of his last employer for considerably less than two years
he was disabled by reason of developing silicosis and he sought compensation from the commissioner. The silicoses section of the West
-

9 11 S. E. (2d) 111 (W. Va. 1940).
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Virginia Worlmen's Compensation Law contains the following
words: "Provided, however, that compensation shall not be payable for the disease of silicosis, or death resulting therefrom, unless
the employee has been exposed to the inhalation of silicon dioxide
dust in harmful quantities over a period of not less than two years
in the same employment in this state." 1 Held, that the provision
should be construed as requiring the applicant to have been exposed for two years previous in the same type or nature of work
and should not be restricted to occupation for that time under the
2
same employer. Hodges v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r.
This seems to be the first time that any court has been called
upon to determine the meaning of these words, but it appears that
the court, in judging the intention of the legislature, reached the
only reasonable conclusion. To construe the provision as requiring
employment under the same employer for two years would in many
cases deprive the applicant of any chance of recovering compensation although it appears clear that the legislature intended compensation to be available in such cases. If the contrary interpretation were to be given the words, a workman who had been employed for many years in an occupation exposing him to silicosis
could not recover compensation unless he had worked for the same
employer for not less than two years.
Although the instant decision is therefore sound, it too may
give rise to many harmful possibilities. The last employer of the disabled worlman is the one whose rating will be affected,3 and as a
consequence employers may be inclined to refrain from hiring
workmen who have been exposed to silicon dioxide dust while in
the employ of others or to discharge such of their own employees
as have been exposed to silicosis for only a little less than the twoyear requirement. This phase of the workmen's compensation law
therefore seems to be in need of legislative attention.
D. D. J., JR.
1 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 23, art. 6, § 5.
217
S. E. (2d) 450 (W. Va. 1941).
3 Renfro v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 130 S. W. (2d) 165 (Mo. 1939);
Johnson v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 217 Mass. 388, 104 N. E. 735
(1914). This proposition was assumed to be the law in the principal ease.
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